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Sonja Schröder 
The 2007-2013 European Cohesion  
Policy 
A New Strategic Approach by the Commission? 
1. Introduction 
The European cohesion policy shares somehow the fate of top-politicians: 
the higher you get, the harder you have to fight to keep your position. To-
day, with allocations accounting for more than 30 per cent of the overall 
EU budget, the European cohesion policy certainly has reached high.  
After a modest start in 1975 with the establishment of the European Re-
gional Development Fund (ERDF), this policy field has constantly ex-
panded both in terms of money and content. Beginning with 1988, 
successive reforms have transformed purely national efforts into a genuine 
European policy field with multi-annual planning documents and budgets, 
specific financial intruments (funds) and shared responsibilities between 
the supra-national, national and sub-national level. However, as the share 
of the EU budget grew constantly, criticism, especially from the part of the 
“net payers”, did so, too. This was most visible during the last controversial 
debates about the European Financial Framework for 2007-13. British 
prime minister Tony Blair even risked a temporary failure of the negotia-
tions to push through his demand for a “modernisation” of the budget.
1 In 
 
1   Tony Blair´s speech to the European Parliament on 23 June 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4122288.stm (Accessed at: 
21.07.2008). Sonja Schröder 
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order to bring negotiations back on track, the president of the Commission 
José Manuel Barroso, suggested to the Member States to use structural 
fund allocations to reach goals set out in the Lisbon Agenda.
2 This proposal 
was included in the agreement on the new European Financial Framework 
on December 15/16
th 2005 and consequently formed the basis for the (at 
that time ongoing) negotiations on a realignment of EU structural funds. 
The inter-institutional agreement between Council, Parliament and Com-
mission on May 17
th 2006 finally laid down the new legal framework of 
European cohesion policy for the 2007-13 period, incorporating the idea of 
focusing structural funds more on economic growth, competitiveness and 
employment. 
In the light of this development, this paper takes a closer look at the content 
of the new framework programme, trying to find out whether the European 
Commission has adopted a new strategic approach compared to the previ-
ous period. Since most of the literature devoted to this subject is restricted 
to a mere description of new features, this paper goes one step further try-
ing to shed light on the reasons explaining the attempt of the Commission 
to keep some elements while changing others. Besides, special attention is 
given to the situation after eastward enlargment in 2004. 
In order to address these issues, the paper starts by outlining its main re-
search questions and methodological framework, while also presenting 
some background information on EU cohesion policy. In the following 
chapters, the four main principles concentration, programming, additional-
ity and partnership are examined for the periods 2000-06 and 2007-13 as 
described below. Finally, some concluding remarks will bring the paper to 
a close. 
 
2   President Barroso presents five proposals to relaunch negotiations on EU Financial 
Perspective for 2007-13, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction. 
do?reference=IP/05/1318&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=
en (Accessed at: 21.07.2008). The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy 
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2. The Framework 
Due to the given limits of this paper, the analysis cannot take a longitudinal 
approach, but has to restrict the comparison to the previous and current pe-
riod. The four main principles concentration, programming, additionality 
and partnership will be in the centre of attention in order to account for a 
clear structure of the paper. 
2.1. Research questions 
The comparative analysis of this paper focuses on three research questions, 
of which the first is the leading one: 
1.  Does the European Commission follow a new strategic approach in 
the framework programme 2007-13?  
2.  What are the reasons explaining the attempt of the Commission to 
keep some elements while changing others? 
3.  To what extent is the eastward enlargement reflected in the new 
framework programme? 
2.2. Methodological approach 
In order to give an answer to these questions, the paper focuses on the four 
main principles concentration,  programming,  addition and partnership, 
which will be discussed in more detail below. Other aspects like financial 
management, new financial instruments or the process of evaluation are 
neglected on purpose in order to avoid a superficial analysis. 
Comparing the current policy phase to the 2000-06 period, the same struc-
ture is applied to each of the four principles: First, the respective principle 
is described and examined in both the periods 2000-06 and 2007-13, trying 
to identify changes on the level of intruments and objectives. Second, a 
short summary highlightens major differences between the two periods, 
serving as a basis for the subsequent part.
3 Finally, attention will be given 
 
3   As the principles of additionality and partnership are characterized by less com-
plexity than the first two principles, there won´t be a separate chapter summing up 
the major differences.  Sonja Schröder 
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to the reasons explaining why the Commission decided to take over some 
elements from the previous period while changing others.  
The comparison between the 2000-06 and 2007-13 periods is based first 
and foremost on primary sources, especially the legal provisions laid down 
in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999 and Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1083/2006. The attempt to explain elements of continuity and change 
is grounded on the annual reports of the Commission, comprising the so-
called “progress reports on cohesion”, “reports on economic and social co-
hesion” as well as thematic papers on the implementation of certain princi-
ples. Both parts of the analysis will be rounded off by secondary literature.  
2.3. Definitions  
Most of the basic terms used in this policy field have quite specific mean-
ing, but are somehow used interchangeably. According to Hooghe, EU co-
hesion policy “refers to the set of activities aimed at the reduction of 
regional and social disparities in the European Union.”
4 This definition 
might easily be used also to describe EU regional policy which is under-
stood as a policy field “concerned with correcting economic and social dis-
parities between European regions (…).”
5 Up to the new framework 
programme 2007-13, the main instruments for EU cohesion policy con-
sisted of four main structural funds: the European Agricultural Fund for 
Guidance, the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development 
Fund and the Financial Instrument of Fisheries Guidance. The Cohesion 
Fund is usually not included in this category.
6 However, in the framework 
of this paper the term “structural fund” will be used for all existing funds 
in order to facilitate reading. If attention is to be drawn to a special fund, 
this will be indicated.  
Finally, the notion of “strategic approach” needs to be clarified in order to 
answer the leading question of this paper. A strategic approach is long-term 
 
4    Hooghe, Liesbet (1996): Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building 
Multi-Level Governance, Oxford University Press, p. 3. 
5   Bache, Ian/George, Stephen (2006): Politics in the European Union, Second Edi-
tion, Oxford University Press, p. 458. 
6   Ibid., p. 458.  The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy 
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oriented and usually not restricted to the level of instruments but refers to 
goals and objectives. In this sense, one can speak of a new strategic ap-
proach, if the long-term objectives of a policy are changed.  
3. EU Cohesion Policy: some general remarks 
The aim of this chapter is not to give a complete historical overview of the 
EU cohesion policy, this has been done more accurately and in-depth else-
where.
7 It is rather the attempt to present some selective background infor-
mation in order to facilitate the understanding of the subsequent analysis.  
According to Art. 158 EC Treaty, the purpose of EU cohesion policy is to 
promote economic and social cohesion across Europe by “reducing dispari-
ties between the levels of development of the various regions and the 
backwardness of the least favoured regions or islands, including rural ar-
eas”. Although a very general version of this objective can be traced back 
to the Treaty of Rome (1957), it was not until 1975 that the European Re-
gional Development Fund (ERDF) was created. Similar to the parallel 
evolving European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Agricultural Guid-
ance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) it remained however a rather national 
policy with little influence of the Commission. The starting shot for a genu-
ine European cohesion policy took place in the late 1980´s in the context of 
southern enlargement and the single market programme. While the Single 
European Act (SEA) introduced the “objective of economic and social co-
hesion” in 1986, the landmark reform of 1988 doubled financial allocations 
and introduced the four core principles of cohesion policy, which are still 
valid today: concentration,  programming,  additionality and partnership. 
European cohesion policy was further developed under two additional re-
forms (1993 and 1999) aiming at improving the design, management and 
 
7   For a review of the history see, among others: Bache/George (2006); Allen, David 
(2005): Cohesion and Structural Funds, in: Wallace, Helen/Wallace, Wil-
liam/Pollack, Mark A. (eds.): Policy-Making in the European Union, Fifth Edition, 
Oxford University Press, pp. 213-243; Leonardi, Robert (2005): Cohesion Policy in 
the European Union. The Building of Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York.  Sonja Schröder 
8   
implementation of the funds.
8 New challenges resulting from eastward 
enlargement and a general economic slowdown have finally led to the 
fourth major reform in 2006, upon which the current framework pro-
gramme is based.
9 In the period 2007-13 cohesion policy will benefit from 
35.7% of the total EU budget or 347.41 billion Euros (current prices).
10 On 
the one hand, this represents the highest amount in the history of EU cohe-
sion policy. On the other hand, the number of potential recipients has also 
grown due to the fifth enlargement round. 
4. Concentration 
The first principle to be examined is concentration, which means that EU 
assistance is to be concentrated on the areas of greatest need as defined by 
a limited number of objectives. 
4.1. Objectives 2000-2006 
In the 2000-06 period, there were three priority objectives as well as four 
Community initiatives. Objective 1 continued to promote the development 
of regions where the GDP per capita was less than 75 per cent of the EU 
average, but with a stricter application of the eligibility criterion.
11 Fur-
thermore, Objective 1 also included those regions previously eligible for 
Objective 6.
12 The new Objective 2 was supposed to support regions facing 
structural difficulties like “industrial and service sectors, declining rural 
 
8   For more details see Sutcliffe, John B. (2000): The 1999 reform of the structural 
fund regulations: multi-level governance or renationalization?, in: Journal of Euro-
pean Public Policy 7:2, June 2000, pp. 290-309.  
9   The current framework is based on one general regulation (Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1083/2006) as well as four specific regulations related to each fund.  
10    Regional Policy – Inforegio, available at: http:// ec.europa.eu/regional_policy 
/policy/funds/index_en.htm. (Accessed at: 5.07.2008). 
11  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, p. 2. 
12  Objective 6 was introduced after the 1995 enlargement (Austria, Finland, Sweden) 
for developing sparsely populated Nordic regions. It drew funds from the ERDF, 
ESF and EAGGF and accounted for less than 3 per cent of total funds. See Allen 
(2005), p. 221.  The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy 
  9
areas, urban areas in difficulty and depressed areas dependent on fishing”.
13 
The population of the Community covered by Objective 2 was not to ex-
ceed 18 per cent of the total EU population.
14 Objective 3 applied to those 
areas not covered by the first objective and focused especially on the mod-
ernization of systems of education, training and employment.
15 Finally, an-
other change concerning the concentration of funds was the reduction in the 
number of Community initiatives from thirteen to four: INTERREG, 
URBAN, LEADER and EQUAL.  
Table 1: The cohesion policy architecture. 
2006-06 2007-13 
Objectives 
Financial instru-
ments 
Objectives 
Financial instru-
ments 
Objective 1 
Regions lagging 
behind in devel-
opment terms 
ERDF 
ESF 
EAGGF-Guarantee 
EAGGF-Guidance 
FIFG 
Convergence 
ERDF 
ESF 
Cohesion Fund 
Cohesion Fund  Cohesion Fund 
Objective 2 
Economic and 
social conversion 
zones  
ERDF 
ESF   
Regional competi-
tiveness and em-
ployment 
ERDF 
ESF  Objective 3 
Training systems 
and employment 
policies 
ESF 
Interreg III  ERDF 
European territo-
rial copperation 
ERDF 
URBAN II  ERDF 
EQUAL ESF 
Leader+ EAGGF-Guarantee 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2007b): Cohesion Policy 2007-13. 
Commentaries and official texts, January 2007, p.10. 
 
13  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, p. 2.  
14  According to Concil Regulation 1260/1999, the population should constitute about 
10 % of the  population in the case of industrial areas, 5 % in the case of rural areas, 
2 % in the case of the urban areas and 1 % in the case of fisheries areas. Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, p. 3. 
15  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, p. 3.  Sonja Schröder 
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4.2. Objectives 2007-2013 
Taking into account the existing structural funds as well as Community ini-
tiatives, the number of objectives and funds was further reduced in the 
2007-2013 period. The new Council Regulation 1083/2006 distinguishes 
three main objectives, which will be elaborated in greater detail below: 
Convergence, Regional Competitiveness and Employment as well as Euro-
pean Territorial Cooperation.
16 In addition, the number of financial instru-
ments (funds) was reduced from six to three and the principle of 
“monofunding” introduced, meaning that one programme can only be fi-
nanced by a single fund. 
Convergence objective 
According to the new Council Regulation (EC) No.1083/2006, the Conver-
gence objective aims at “speeding up the convergence of the least devel-
oped Member States and regions by improving conditions for growth and 
employment (…)”.
17 The main emphasis is put on the development of in-
novation and the knowledge society, the investment in human capital, the 
adaptability to economic and social change as well as the quality of the en-
vironment and administrative efficiency.
18 For the first time, the old Mem-
ber States (EU15) have to invest 60 per cent of their allocations granted 
under the Convergence objective to achieve goals set out in the Lisbon 
Agenda. While this so-called “earmarking” is compulsory for the EU15, it 
is only voluntary for the new Member States.  
The Convergence objective is financed by the European Regional Devel-
opment Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion 
Fund. Three types of areas are eligible under the Convergence objective: 
convergence regions, phasing-out regions and states eligible for Cohesion 
Funds.  
 
16  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down the general 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund 
and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999. 
17  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, p. 37.  
18   Commission of the European Communities (2007b): Cohesion Policy 2007-13. 
Commentaries and official texts, January 2007, p. 13.  The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy 
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Convergence regions are comparable with the former Objective 1 regions 
under Council Regulation 1260/1999. These are NUTS 2 regions whose per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) is less than 75 per cent of the Com-
munity average.
19 Coverage of the convergence regions is heavily concen-
trated in the new EU member states as well as the southern periphery.
20 In 
comparison, less than half of the former least developed regions of the 
EU15 will be funded under this objective in the new period 2007-13.
21  
Because of the so-called “statistical effect” of enlargement some regions 
are not eligible for the Convergence objective anymore. Therefore, regions 
with a GDP per head between 75 per cent of the EU25 average and 75 per 
cent of the EU15 average have a “phasing-out” status und will get transi-
tional support up to 2013.  
In the 2007-13 period the Cohesion Fund will no longer function independ-
ently but be included in the Convergence objective (see Table 1). Member 
States where the gross national income (GNI) per capita is below 90 per 
cent of the Community average are eligible for the Cohesion Fund. Mem-
ber States who would have been eligible for the Cohesion Fund if the 
threshold had remained 90 per cent of the EU15, get transitional support 
similar to the “phasing-out” regions. In this way, a financial instrument 
whose eligibility depends on national performance, is used to attain the 
goal of fighting the socio-economic disparaties between regions.
22 
 
19  In order to classify territorial units, the European Union adopted the definition de-
veloped by Eurostat, which divides the European territory into five levels of geo-
graphic aggregations. The regional level was definied as NUTS II. See Leonardi 
(2005), p. 7. 
20  Bachtler, John/Wishlade, Fiona/Mendez, Carlos (2007): New Budget, New Regula-
tions, New Strategies: The 2006 Reform of EU Cohesion Policy, European Policy 
Research Paper, Number 63, European Policies Research Centre, University of 
Strathclyde, p. 14.  
21  Becker, Peter/Zaun, Natascha (2007): Die neue strategische Planung der europä-
ischen Kohäsionspolitik in Theorie und Praxis, Diskussionspapier der FG 1, 
2007/22, Dezember 2007, SWP Berlin, p. 9. 
22  Ibid., p. 10. Sonja Schröder 
12   
Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective 
According to Council Regulation No. 1083/2006 the Regional Competi-
tiveness and Employment (RCE) objective aims at “strenghening regions´ 
competitiveness and attractiveness as well as employment by anticipating 
economic and social changes” and is financed by the ERDF and ESF.
23 The 
previous Objectives 2 and 3 are therefore concentrated in the RCE objec-
tive, which includes all regions which are not eligible for the Convergence 
objective.
24 Generally, the RCE comprises two different strands: Phasing-in 
regions and RCE regions. Phasing-in regions are former Objective 1 re-
gions which have outgrown that status for the period 2007-13.
25 RCE re-
gions cover all regions that do not fall under the Covergence, Phasing-out 
or Phasing-in objectives. Consequently, the RCE objective is heavily con-
centrated in the old Member States, most notably in Germany, France and 
the UK.
26 
Regarding the merging of former Objectives 2 and 3 into the new Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment objective, two important observations 
can be made: First, while the former Objective 2 was spatially restricted to 
areas facing structural change, the new regional competitiveness and em-
ployment objective is rather thematic than geographical in approach.
27 
Therefore the latter may be considered comparable rather to former Objec-
tive 3 since it was also restricted to areas not eligible for Objective 1 (re-
spective convergence) regions. Second, there is no area designation at EU 
level for the Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective, since it 
is now the responsibility of the Member States to determine the NUTS I 
and II regions.
28 Finally,  the so-called “earmarking” is also visible in the 
 
23  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, p. 37. 
24  Becker/Zaun (2007), p. 10. 
25  In 2007, there were 13 such regions in the EU25, with a total population of over 19 
million people or 4.2 per cent of the EU25 population. See Bach-
tler/Wishlade/Méndez (2007), p. 17.  
26  Ibid., p. 18.  
27  Ibid., p. 20. 
28  Bachtler, John/Mendez, Carlos (2007): Who Governs EU Cohesion Policy? Decon-
structing the Reforms of the Structural Funds, Journal of Common Market Studies 
2007, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 535-564, p. 544. The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy 
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Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective with 75 per cent of 
the available funds dedicated to the Lisbon goals. 
European Territorial Cooperation objective 
The European Territorial Cooperation objective aims at strenghening cross-
border cooperation, transnational cooperation and inter-territorial coopera-
tion. The previous Community initiatives INTERREG III, URBAN, 
EQUAL and LEADER are concentrated in this new objective, while the 
previous financial instruments are substituted by one single fund, the ERDF 
(see Table 1).  
For cross-border cooperation, eligible areas are NUTS level 3 regions along 
all internal and some external land borders as well as maritime borders 
separated by a maximum of 150 km.
29 For transnational cooperation all re-
gions are theoretically eligible, but the Commission has, in consultation 
with the Member States, identified 13 specific cooperation zones.
30 Inter-
territorial cooperation is finally possible between all European Union re-
gions. Compared to the previous period, the main difference consists of 
upgrading Community initiatives and shifting priorities. The status of the 
former Community initatives INTERREG III, EQUAL, LEADER and 
URBAN was upgraded in the new period 2007-13, since they were trans-
ferred into a separate category, the European Territorial Cooperation objec-
tive. Furthermore, thematic emphasis shifted from classical infrastructure 
projects to economic subjects such as research and development, informa-
tion society etc.  
4.3. Main differences 
To sum up, in the period 2007-13 the principle of concentration is charac-
terized by the following: 
1.  Priority of cohesion policy still on lagging regions  
2.  No real concentration of funds 
3.  Strong focus on Lisbon strategy 
 
29  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, p. 38. 
30  Commission (2007b), p. 20. Sonja Schröder 
14   
The most visible element of continuity is the ongoing priority on lagging 
regions with a per capita GDP less than 75 per cent under the new Conver-
gence objective. Eligibility under this objective is still decided by EU-wide 
criteria. However, it should be noticed that no real concentration of funds 
has been attained. Even if 81,54 per cent of the cohesion policy budget for 
2007-13 is spent on this first objective, several additional provisions im-
pede a real concentration on the most disadvantaged regions.
31 First of all, 
the so-called “phasing-out” regions and all areas eligible for the Cohesion 
Fund account together for around 30 per cent of the overall resources for 
the Convergence objective.
32 Second, the Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment objective includes all regions not eligible for the Convergence 
objective, which therefore includes mainly old Member States. Finally, 
more regions than before are eligible under the new European Territorial 
Cooperation objective, also weakening the concentration of resources.
33 
Finally, it is noteworthy, that under the Regional Competitiveness and Em-
ployment objective, it is now the Member States who decide eligibility of 
their regions. 
The most visible change compared to the previous period is certainly the 
strong focus on priorities set out in the Lisbon Agenda. In the Convergence 
objective the old Member States (EU15) have to spend around 60 per cent 
of their funds to achieve goals mentioned in the Lisbon Agenda.
34 This so-
called “earmarking” is also visible in the Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment objective, where even 75 per cent of the available funds have 
be used for programmes related to the Lisbon Agenda.
35  
 
31  The numbers correspond to the indications made in Concil Regulation (EC) No. 
1083/2006. The shares of the total amount allocated to cohesion policy are the fol-
lowing: Convergence objective receives 81.54 %, the Regional Competitiveness 
and Employment objective 15.95 % and the European Territorial objective 2.52 % 
of the overall cohesion budget. 
32  According to Concil Regulation No. 1083/2006, 4,99% are spent for phasing-out 
regions, 23,22 % for the regions eligible under the Cohesion fund and 1,29% for 
transitional support under the Cohesion fund.  
33  Becker/Zaun (2007), p. 11. 
34  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, p. 38. 
35  Becker/Zaun (2007), p. 10. The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy 
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4.4. Explaining elements of continuity and change 
In the run-up to a new legal framework for the European cohesion policy  
2007-13 and especially against the background of eastward enlargement, 
the topic of concentration was one of the most frequent discussed issues 
(apart from the notorious struggle about the EU budget). From the very be-
ginning the Commission acknowledged that “cohesion policy should con-
tinue to target the least developed regions”.
36 In every “progress report on 
economic and social cohesion” since 2001, a multitude of indicators was 
presented in order to illustrate the approaching economic and social diffi-
culties linked to eastward enlargement. While numbers differed slightly 
from year to year, the general trend was clear: First, enlargement would 
bring about a widening of regional and territorial disparities without prece-
dent, as the average level of GDP per head would fall between 13 and 18 
per cent.
37 Second, a geographical shift in the pattern of disparities was in-
dicated, meaning that in a EU25 more people would live in regions with a 
per capita GDP below 75 per cent.
38 Third, enlargement would give rise to 
a less advantageous employment situation, so that more jobs need to be 
created to account for differences in the rate of unemployment.
39  
While pointing out to the challenges of enlargement, the Commission indi-
rectly used a second approach to justify the continuing priority on lagging 
regions: the confirmation of real convergence between EU Member States. 
According to its first progress report in 2002, economic disparities between 
 
36    Commission of the European Communities (2002): Communication from the 
Commission. First progress report on economic and social cohesion, Brussels, 
30.1.2002, COM (2002) 46 final, p. 4. 
37  According to 1999 data, passing from 15 to 27 Member States, average GDP would 
fall by 18%, while passing from 15 to 25 Member States, GDP per head would only 
fall by 13%. Commission (2002), p. 2. 
38  The indicated numbers are the following: in a EU25, 116 million people, represent-
ing around 25% of the total population, will live in regions with a per capita GDP 
below 75% as against 68 million people, or 18% of the total population, in the 
EU15. Commission of the European Communities (2003): Communication from the 
Commission. Second progress report on economic and social cohesion, Brussels, 
30.1.2003, COM (2003) 34 final, p. 2.  
39   According to the Communication of the Commission (2002), three million jobs 
need to be created if the average level of employment in the new Member States is 
to be aligned with the situation in the old Member States. Commission  (2002), p. 2.  Sonja Schröder 
16   
the Member States, especially in the cohesion countries, have diminished. 
Furthermore, a reduction in regional disparities was identified, even if to a 
lesser extent than at the national level.
40  
Finally, the choice of the indicator for eligibility of lagging regions re-
mained also relatively undisputed. As stated by the Commission there was 
no “viable alternative to that of GDP per head”.
41 Furthermore, the previ-
ous eligibility criteria based on NUTS II and GDP per head had the “merit 
of being simple and transparent”.
42 Consequently, the current Convergence 
regions were based on criteria comparable to that of the previous Objective 
1 regions, namely a GDP per capita below 75 per cent.  
Despite the agreed priority on lagging regions, there was nevertheless a 
broad agreement on the need to include regions whose process of economic 
convergence was not (yet) completed, but were not eligible for the Conver-
gence objective due to “statistical effects”.
43 In addition, the Commission 
mentioned at an early stage all other possible “special cases” which had to 
be taken into account even if not among the most needy regions. This prin-
ciple of giving everyone an equal share partly undermines the real concen-
tration of funds, but has to be understood as a common pattern under the 
primacy of unanimity.
44  
Regarding the transfer of responsibility for area designation to the Member 
States under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective, 
Bachtler and Mendez offer a plausible explanation.
45 In the run-up to the 
negotiations of the new budget, the existence of a future Objective 2 was 
threatened by a group of “net payers”, namely Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the UK, who wanted to restrict EU cohesion policy to the 
poorest regions.
46 The Commission responded to this threat by proposing to 
 
40  Commission (2002), p. 8.  
41  Commission (2002), p. 4. 
42  Commission (2003), p. 3. 
43  Commission (2003), p. 3.  
44  See Petzold, Wolfgang (2006): Die Reform der EU-Strukturpolitik 2007-2013 zwi-
schen Verteilungslogik und Europäisierung, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2006, 
pp. 552-575, p. 558.  
45  The following ideas are completely based on Bachtler and Mendez (2007), p. 545.  
46  Bachtler/Mendez (2007), p. 545.  The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy 
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transform Objectives 2 and 3 into a Regional Competitiveness and Em-
ployment objective, linking it to the goals of the Lisbon/Gothenburg agen-
das. According to the authors, this transfer of responsibility for area 
designation has to be seen “as a trade-off (…) to secure the continuation of 
structural funds outside the least-developed countries, thus retaining Com-
mission influence on cohesion policy across the EU”.
47  
Finally, the strong focus on the priorities set out in the Lisbon Agenda has 
to be adressed. In order to explain this step, the Commission brought for-
ward two main reasons: the weak performance of the European economy 
and the suitability of cohesion policy to implement the Lisbon goals. It ap-
pears that already in 2001 the Commission prepared the ground for such a 
reform by stating the following: “While enlargement is major part of the 
explanation for the need for change, it is not the only one in view of the far 
reaching economic and social and territorial changes affecting the present 
EU15”.
48 The challenges implied in this statement were, among others, a 
slowdown in economic growth, low productivity, high unemployment, low 
R&D expenditure etc.
49 
The link to the Lisbon Agenda was established in two different ways. First, 
the Commission made a reference to an evaluation stressing the overlap-
ping objectives of both the EU cohesion policy and the Lisbon strategy.
50 
Second, the delivery system of the Structural Funds was seen as very suit-
able to implement the Lisbon goals and in this way “enhancing the owner-
ship of the Lisbon strategy by the regions and of managing complex 
development tasks under different conditions on the ground”.
51 
Allowing some room for interpretation, a third reason can finally be identi-
fied. With regard to an enlarged union with 27 Member states, there was a 
 
47  Bachtler/Mendez (2007), p. 545.  
48   Commission of the European Communities (2001): Second report on economic and 
social cohesion, adopted by the Commission on 31 January 2001, no pages indi-
cated. 
49  See for instance: Commission (2003). 
50   Commission of the European Communities (2005a): Communication from the 
Commission. Third progress report on cohesion: Towards a new partnership for 
growth, jobs and cohesion, Brussels, xxxx, COM (2005), p. 7.  Sonja Schröder 
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high pressure to trim the policy and the budget of the structural funds. By 
linking cohesion policy to the Lisbon strategy, the Commission was able to 
justify the existence of the policy field and to secure its own sphere of in-
fluence in the long-run.
52  
5. Programming 
Programming is the thematic allocation of EU structural funds. Like the 
principle of concentration this approach was introduced by the 1988 re-
forms. It basically included a shift from individual projects under Member 
States schemes to multi-annual programmes, designed in line with Com-
munity objectives and approved by the Commission.
53  
5.1. 2000-2006: CSFs, OPs and SPDs 
During the 2000-06 period the implementation of structural fund assistance 
continued to take place similar to the previous framework programme, but 
was streamlined and simplified in some respect. First, a development plan 
had to be submitted by the Member States, drawn up in partnership with its 
regional authorities. On the basis of this development plan a so-called 
Community Support Framework (CSF) was established and adopted by the 
Commission. Operational Programmes (OPs) were then suggested by 
Member States. Finally, Single Programming Documents (SPDs) were 
adopted by the Commission. 
 
51  Commission (2005a), p. 7.  
52  See also Petzold (2006), p. 570.  
53  Bachtler/ Méndez (2007), p. 547. The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy 
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Table 2: Strategic approach and programming 
2000-06 2007-13 
1. Development Plan 
2. Community support framework  
    (CSFs) 
3. Operational programmes (OPs) 
4. Single Programming Document 
    (SPDs) 
5. Programming Complement 
1. Community Strategic Guidelines 
2. National Strategic Reference   
    Framework (NSRF) 
3. Operational Programmes (OPs) 
Source: European Commission (2007b), p. 29. 
5.2. 2007-2013: A single strategic version? 
Under the new Council Regulation 1083/2006 the principle of program-
ming is divided into two different parts, namely a “strategic approach to 
cohesion” (Title II) and “programming” (Title III).
54 Title II introduces a 
new strategic layer, while Title III refers to the so-called “Operational Pro-
grammes”. 
The new strategic approach to cohesion represents an important change 
compared to the previous period. It involves the adoption of Community 
Strategic Guidelines (CSGs) at the EU level to support the design of Na-
tional Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRFs), which in turn form the 
basis of the above mentioned Operational Programmes (OPs).  
Community Strategic Guidelines are guidelines suggested by the Commis-
sion and adopted by the Council, in accordance with the Parliament´s opin-
ion. Their main purpose is to define “an indicative framework for the 
intervention of the Funds, taking account of other relevant Community 
policies”.
55 The current guidelines presented by the Commission on 5
th July 
2006 include three main priorities: (1) Making Europe and its regions more 
 
54  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006. 
55  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, p. 42.  Sonja Schröder 
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attractive places to invest and work, (2) improving knowledge and innova-
tion for growth and (3) more and better jobs.
56 
The Member States have then to prepare National Strategic Reference 
Frameworks (NSRFs), which have to be in line with the Community Stra-
tegic Guidelines. According to the Commission, the NSRFs do not repre-
sent classical management instruments, as were the Community Support 
Frameworks (CSFs) in the period 2000-06, but define policy priorities ac-
cording to the CSGs while suggesting key elements of implementation.
57 
The NSRFs have to be applied to the Convergence and Regional Competi-
tiveness and Employment objectives, while their applicability to the Euro-
pean Teritorial Cooperation objective is voluntary. The main elements of 
the NSRFs are an outline of the strategy and its justification based on de-
velopment problems and trends, a list of the OPs, an indicative annual allo-
cation from each fund as well as arrangements for coordination with other 
EU funding. It is worth emphasizing that the NSRFs shall also include a 
description concerning their contribution to the Lisbon strategy priorities.
58  
Finally, a so-called “strategic follow-up” has been introduced. Within the 
framework of the Lisbon strategy, EU Member States have to adopt Na-
tional Reform Programmes (NRPs). For the first time, these annual reports 
must include also a section explaing the contribution of the Operational 
Programmes to the implementation of the NRP. Furthermore, there is a 
“strategic reporting” by the Commission including summaries of the Mem-
ber States´ annual reports as well as a Cohesion report.  
The Member States´ Operational Programmes (OPs), which focus on the 
regional level, are built around the priorities set out in the National Strate-
gic Reference Frameworks. They are only concerned with one of the three 
objectives and benefit only from the funding of a single fund (“monofund-
 
56   Commission of the European Communities (2005c): Communication from the 
Commission. Cohesion Policy in Support of Growth and Jobs: Community Strate-
gic Guidelines, 2007-2013, Brussels, 5.7.2005, COM (2005) 299 final. See also 
Becker/Zaun (2007), p. 12 ff. 
57  European Commission (2007b), p. 28. 
58  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, p. 43.  The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy 
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ing”).
59 The main elements which the OPs must consists of are: an analysis 
of the eligible area, a justification of priorities based on the CSG, NSRF 
and an ex-ante evaluation, the specific objectives of the key priorities, 
funding plans, the implementation of the programmes as well as an indica-
tive list of large projects.
60 The Commission evaluates each programme in 
order to determine whether it complies with the objectives and priorities set 
out in the Community Strategic Guidelines and the National Strategic Ref-
erence Frameworks. 
61 
5.3. Main differences 
To sum up, the main changes concerning the principle of programming are 
as follows: 
1.  Reduction in the number of instruments and simplification of man-
agement 
2.  A hierarchical structure with strong focus on Lisbon Agenda 
3.  A shift in the Commission´s influence from the programme level to 
the strategic policy level 
In comparison to the previous period the number of instruments has been 
reduced. Community support frameworks (CSFs), single programming 
documents (SPDs) and programming complements do not exist anymore. 
Even if priorities existed in the period 2000-06, there will be only one sin-
gle document adopted by the Council, the Community Strategic Guidelines, 
defining the programming priorities. Furthermore, with the National Stra-
tegic Reference Frameworks the Member States introduce a single strategy 
for their national level. Regarding the interplay of the new instruments in-
troduced, a clear vertical structure can be identified. At the top the Com-
 
59  There are nevertheless exceptions to this rule: the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund can 
participate together for infrastructure and environmental programmes. Furthermore, 
according to Art. 32.2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, it is possible to 
follow more than one objective under certain circumstances. See Commission of the 
European Communities (2007b): Cohesion Policy 2007-13. Commentaries and offi-
cial texts, January 2007, p. 32.  
60  Ibid.  
61  For a detailed description see Bachtler/Wishlade/Méndez (2007), p. 54.  Sonja Schröder 
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munity Strategic Guidelines define the indicative framework for the EU27 
at the supra-national level. These are followed by National Strategic Refer-
ence Frameworks at the national level, which in turn form the basis of the 
Operational Programmes at the regional level.
62 The very new feature con-
sists of the fact that the CSGs are now adopted by the Council with quali-
fied majority and not only by the Commission as it was the case in the 
2000-06 period.
63 In addition, there is a clear link between the new cohe-
sion policy instruments and the strategic instruments in the framework of 
the Lisbon Agenda. The CSGs as well as the NSRFs refer to the respective 
documents of the Lisbon strategy, namely the “Integrated Guidelines for 
Growth and Jobs” for the European level and the “National Reform Pro-
grammes” of the EU Member States.
64 The strong focus on the Lisbon 
goals becomes also visible when comparing the concrete strategic guide-
lines of the Commission. While the guidelines for the 2000-06 period men-
tion the EU´s cohesion policy first aim to “help to reduce economic and 
social disparities”, the guidelines for 2007-13 start with a citation of the 
European Council in March 2005: “Europe must renew the basis of its 
competitiveness, increase its growth potential and its productivity and 
strenghen social cohesion, placing the main emphasis on knowledge, inno-
vation and the optimisation of human capital”.
65  
Finally, there is a shift in the Commission´s influence from the programme 
level to the strategic policy level as will be explained in more detail below. 
5.4. Explaining elements of continuity and change 
The Commission acknowledged from the very beginning the high demand 
for a simplificiation of the management and implementation system of 
 
62  Becker/Zaun (2007), p. 12. 
63  Similar guidelines existed already in the previous period 2000-06, but these were 
only adopted by the Commission after consultation with the Member States. Petzold 
(2006), p. 570.  
64   Commission of the European Communities (2005d): Integrated Guidelines for 
Growth and Jobs (2005-2008), Brussels, 12.4.2005, COM (2005), 141 final, p. 12. 
65  Commission (2005c), p. 4 and Commission of the European Communities (1999): 
The structural funds and their coordination with the cohesion fund. Guidelines for 
programmes in the period 2000-06, 1.7.1999, p. 1. The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy 
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funds by the Member States.
66 Especially the level of details required by 
the Commission and additional information in the so-called “programme 
complements” were mentioned as matters of concern.
67 Member States also 
demanded a greater decentralisation of responsibilities while broad strate-
gic aspects should still be agreed with the Commission.
68 As a response the 
Commission reduced the number of instruments as outlined in the previous 
chapter and relinquished the requirement of certain documents like the 
“programme complements”.
69 The management and delivery of the funds 
was increasingly decentralised to the Member States.
70 Besides, the “prin-
ciple of proportionality” was introduced, requiring the financial and admin-
istrative resources in the implementation of funds to be proportional to the 
“total amount of expenditure allocated to an operational programme”.
71 In 
this way, simplified administrative procedures are allowed in the case of 
smaller programmes.
72 
The reasons for the strong link between programming and the Lisbon 
Agenda may partly resemble with those mentioned in chapter 4.4. Espe-
cially after the 2004 enlargement and the revitalization of the Lisbon 
Agenda in 2005, the issue of growth and jobs became increasingly relevant 
to the reform of the cohesion policy. By introducing Community Strategic 
Guidelines, the Commission (and the Council!) ensures that their content is 
targeted on the Lisbon goals. The National Strategic Frameworks on the 
other hand define priorities in line with the Lisbon Agenda while also “in-
 
66  For instance in the first progress report on cohesion it is stated that „ one of the 
goals set out in Agenda 2000 was to simplify the system for implementing the 
Structural Funds. There appears to have been insufficient practical progress in this 
direction.” Commission (2002), p. 23.  
67  Commission (2002), p. 23.  
68  Commission (2003), p. 6.  
69  Petzold (2006), p. 571.  
70 Ferry, Martin/Gross, Frederike/Bachtler, John/McMaster, Irene (2007): Turning 
Strategies into Projects: The Implication of 2007-13 Structural Funds Programmes, 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper No. 20(2), European Policies Research Centre, University 
of Strathclyde, p. 12.  
71  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, p. 38.  
72  The principle applies to the choice of indicators, evaluation procedures, general 
principles of management and control systems as well as reporting requirements. 
Bachtler/Wishlade/Méndez (2007), p. 52. Sonja Schröder 
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creasing the consistency with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and 
the European Employment Strategy”.
73 The underlying understanding of 
the new programming period is probably best described by the Commission 
itself: “ The key test for cohesion policy programmes in (the) future will be 
their contribution to growth and jobs in line with the renewed Lisbon 
Agenda”.
74 
Finally, a shift in the Commission´s influence from the programme level to 
the strategic policy level was identified. This can be explained as follows: 
According to an analysis by Bachtler and Wishlade, the complexity of 
structural funds programme management was a cause of tensions between 
the Commission and some EU Member States.
75 Additionally, several na-
tional governments drafted proposals for radical reform of the EU cohesion 
policy for the 2007-13 period.
76 As a response to this development, the 
Commission tried to shift its influence from the programming level to the 
strategic policy level. In return for decentralisation and a simplification of 
operational programme management, the Commission introduced a new 
strategic layer of policy planning.
77 In this way, the Member States gain 
more influence in the field of management and implementation, while the 
Commission can ensure more coherence between cohesion policy and the 
Lisbon and Gothenburg agendas and make Member States more politically 
acountable for the implementation of the funds.
78 This last aspect is most 
visible in the new “strategic follow-up”. For the first time, all Member 
 
73  Commission (2005a), p. 11.  
74   Commission of the European Communities (2006a): Communication from the 
Commission. The Growth and Jobs Strategy and the Reform of European cohesion 
policy. Fourth progress report on cohesion, Brussels, 12.6.2006, COM (2006) 281 
final, p. 7.  
75   Bachtler, John/Wishlade, Fiona (2005): From Building Blocks to Negotiating 
Boxes: The Reform of EU Cohesion Policy, November 2005, European Policy Re-
search Paper Number 57, European Policies Research Centre, University of Strath-
clyde.  
76  Bachtler/ Méndez (2007), p. 554.  
77  As examples for the simplification of operational programme management, Bachtler 
and Méndez mention: audit, financial control, monitoring and evaluation. Bachtler/ 
Méndez (2007), p. 554.  
78  Bachtler/ Méndez (2007), p. 555.  The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy 
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States have to report on a regular basis on the progress of their cohesion 
policy in meeting Community strategic objectives. 
6. Additionality 
The principle of additionality requires Member States to spend allocations 
from the Structural Funds in addition to their own domestic expenditure, so 
that structural policies represent an addition rather than a substitute for na-
tional policies.  
6.1. The principle of Additionality: 2000-06  
In this respect, the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999 states that   
“appropriations of the Funds may not replace public or other equivalent 
structural expenditure by the Member State”.
79 Additionality is to be veri-
fied by setting baseline figures for public or equivalent structural expendi-
ture in a Member States´ Objective 1 regions or, in the case of Objective 2 
and 3, the level of public expenditure that concerns the respective objec-
tives at the national level.
80 However, a certain flexibility is allowed in set-
ting these figures so that Member States can take account of “certain 
specific economic situations, namely privatisations, an exceptional level of 
public structural effort or equivalent effort on the part of the Member State 
during the previous programming period and national economic trends”.
81 
Therefore, the major problem exists in the verification of additionality and 
the missing leverage of the Commission in case of non-compliance by the 
Member States.
82 
6.2. The principle of Additionality: 2007-13 
Concerning the general meaning of additionality, the wording of the new 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006 is almost the same as in the previ-
ous regulation: “Contributions from the Structural Funds shall not replace 
 
79  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, p. 14.  
80  Sutcliffe (2000), p. 304. 
81  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, p. 14. 
82  Sutcliffe (2000), p. 304. Sonja Schröder 
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public or equivalent structural expenditure by a Member State”.
83 Even if 
the new regulation continues to state that structural fund support should be 
genuinely additional, there are nevertheless some differences. In the new 
period 2007-13 the Commission and the Member States shall verify the 
level of public expenditure only for those regions covered by the Conver-
gence objective. The Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective 
as well as the European Territorial objective are not mentioned in this re-
spect. Furthermore, a new financial corrective mechanism exists in the case 
that the principle of additionality is not respected.
84 
6.3. Explaining elements of continuity and change 
In its “Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion” the Commission 
states that the principle of additionality has “demonstrably been respected 
in Objective 1 regions, where, despite the complexities involved, it is pos-
sible to identify the amount of resources being invested”.
85 In contrast, 
verifying the additionality principle in Objectives 2 and 3 regions has 
proved more difficult, leading to an erosion of “its value as a core principle 
for all Objectives of the Funds”.
86 It can therefore be concluded, that be-
cause of the demonstrated difficulties the Commission decided to restrict 
the verification of the additionality principle to the Convergence objective 
(former Objective 1) while offering Member States greater responsibility 
for ensuring that additionality is respected. The latter is also documented in 
a Commission Working Document, which explicitely states that the princi-
ple of additonality will be verified at the national level.
87  
 
83  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, p. 40. 
84   According to Working Document No.3 (December 2006), the Commission may 
proceed to a financial correction in the case that even after submitting all required 
information a Member is still unable to prove that the additionality principle has 
been respected. The exact procedure is laid down in Art. 99 of Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 1083/2006. See European Commission, Working Document No. 3, De-
cember 2006. 
85  Commission of the European Communities (2004): A new partnership for cohesion. 
Covergence, competitiveness, cooperation. Third report on economic and social co-
hesion. COM (2004) 107 of 18 February 2004, p. 164. 
86  Commission (2004), p. 165. 
87  Commission (2006b). The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy 
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7. Partnership 
Officially, the principle of partnership was introduced by the 1988 reforms 
to enhance efficiency of regional policy by involving sub-national actors in 
the planning, decision-making and implementation of structural funds.
88 
Unofficially, the Commission´s intent was also to generate a particular 
governance structure in which the regions should play a significant role.
89 
While this was partially met with resistance by central governments, it is 
still difficult to say whether the principle of partnership has indeed en-
hanced regional and local governmental involvement in the policy proc-
ess.
90 While this has been the subject of intensive study elsewhere, the 
following section focuses on possible changes of the partnership principle 
in the new period 2007-13, especially against the background of eastward 
enlargement.  
7.1. The principle of Partnership: 2000-06 
Council Regulation 1260/1999 refers to the principle of partnership by stat-
ing that “Community actions (…) shall be drawn up in close consultation, 
hereinafter referred to as the “partnership”, between the Commission and 
the Member State, together with the authorities and bodies designated by 
the Member State (…)”.
91 These authorities could comprise a) regional and 
local authorities as well as other public authorities, b) the economic and 
social partners and c) any other relevant competent bodies within the given 
framework.
92 Regarding the various stages of programme management, the 
 
88  See also Bache, Ian (2004): Multi-level Governance and European Union Regional 
Policy, p. 166, in: Bache, Ian/Flinders, Matthew (2004): Multi-level Governance, 
Oxford University Press, pp. 165-179.  
89  This aspect is also emphasized by Allen: “The intent was clear: it was not just to 
improve the efficiency of regional policy, but to give it features specifically de-
signed to penetrate national policy processes. In this sense one core goal was a pol-
icy made for the regions and by the regions; in other words, a policy that 
encouraged not just regionalization, but regionalism.” Allen (2005), p. 231.  
90  The first comprehensive study on the implications of the partnership principle for 
member states was published by Hooghe (1996). Other examples are given in Allen 
(2005), p. 231. 
91  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, p. 11. 
92  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, p. 11. Sonja Schröder 
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partnership was to cover the preparation, financing, monitoring and evalua-
tion of assistance.  
7.2. The principle of Partnership: 2007-13 
The new Council Regulation No.1083/2006 takes over the main ideas, but 
modifies certain aspects. First, it changes the previous definition of partner-
ship from “close consultation” into “close cooperation”.
93 Second, it ex-
tends the number of possible actors by broadening the list of partners. 
According to the new regulation, a partnership is possible with authorities 
and bodies such as: a) the competent regional, local, urban and other public 
authorities, b) the economic and social partners and c) any other appropri-
ate body representing civil society, environmental partners, non-
governmental organisations, and bodies responsible for promoting equality 
between men and women.
94 Regarding the different states of programming, 
the principle of partnership still covers preparation, monitoring and evalua-
tion (of operational programmes), but changes “financing” into “implemen-
tation” and makes a new reference to involving “particularly the regions”.
95 
7.3. Explaining elements of continuity and change 
The first impression when comparing the legal provisions of the principle 
of partnership is that not much has been changed. Partnership is widely re-
garded as successful and extended to even more potential “partners”. Sev-
eral reports prepared by the Commission confirm this view, outlining in 
more detail the experience made in the previous period. The “Third Report 
on Economic and Social Cohesion” for instance emphasizes that partner-
ship remains “a core principle for management, monitoring and evaluation 
of the Funds”
96 and “contributes to the success of programmes by giving 
them greater legitimacy, by making it easier to coordinate them and by in-
creasing their effectiveness as well as transparency”.
97 The value-added of 
 
93  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, p. 39.  
94  See also Bachtler/Wishlade/Méndez (2007), p. 52.  
95  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, p. 39.  
96  Commission (2004), p. 163. 
97  Commission (2004), p. 164.  The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy 
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partnership is localized in four main areas: First, a wide range of expertise 
is available through the involvement of a broad range of views. Second, the 
decision-making process is legitimized through the participation of regional 
and local authorities as well as civil society. Third, the involvement of re-
gional and local partners contributes to the development of institutional ca-
pacity. Last but not least, the planning and implementation process has 
been improved through partnership.
98 However, it has been acknowledged 
that the success of the principle varies from Member State to Member State 
and that there is still room for improvement regarding transparency and ef-
ficiency.
99  
A mere comparison of the legal provisions would consequently lead to the 
conclusion that the partnership principle has been further strenghened in 
the new period 2007-13. However, the opposite might be the case if taking 
into account two additional aspects. First, the “partners” are still chosen by 
the Member States´ national governments. It is therefore not compulsory 
for national governments to include potential partners listed in the new 
regulation. Second, it is helpful to put the partnership principle in its 
broader context. Bachtler and Mendez do this best by stating that “it is im-
portant to bear in mind that the partnership principle is not independent of 
programming, but is a cross-cutting principle which applies to the different 
stages of the programming process (e.g. design, management and imple-
mentation and monitoring and evaluation of structural funds pro-
grammes)”.
100 As shown in chapter 5.4 (programming), there is a shift in 
the Commission´s influence from the programme level to the strategic pol-
icy level, leaving Member States with greater powers in the fields of man-
agement and implementation of the funds. Consequently, as the 
Commission has less influence in this field, this restricts its direct coopera-
tion with regional and local actors, too.  
 
98  European Commission, Discussion paper of GD Regio (2005), p. 4/5.  
99  One point of criticism refers to the fact that the selection of partners is not always 
transparent to the public and that the involvement of regional or local partners is 
sometimes regarded rather a burden than a gain. European Commission, Discussion 
paper of GD Regio (2005), p. 12.  
100 Bachtler/Mendez (2207), p. 540. Sonja Schröder 
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This might be especially important in relation to the new Member States, 
which traditionally have rather centralised systems. On several occasions 
the Commission pointed out to the difficulties related to weak administra-
tive structures and the missing tradition of decentralised policies in order to 
justify certain procedures applied to the new Member States e.g. that in the 
management of funds the central authorities should remain responsible to 
the Commission.
101 Besides, on the eve of enlargement, the Commission 
suggested a transitional phase in order to “balance the aim of the decen-
tralisation of management with the need to ensure the successful absorption 
of Community funds”.
102 Therefore, it might be possible that despite the 
formal extension to a greater number of actors, the partnership principle 
might be weakened in the long-run. 
8. Conclusions 
After analysing the current design of the four core principles concentration, 
programming, additionality and partnership in comparison to the previous 
period, the following can be concluded:  
Against the background of eastward enlargement, the Commission has tried 
to keep the priority on lagging regions with a per capita GDP less than 75 
per cent. Nevertheless, in order to make new Member States benefit under 
this objective, the Commission had to respect several additional provisions 
related to the old Member States (phasing-in regions, phasing-out regions 
etc.). This partly undermined a real concentration of the funds. On the other 
hand, several changes occurred to major policy instruments aiming at sim-
plifying and streamlining EU cohesion policy. Under the principle of con-
centration, a special mention should be made to the reduction in the number 
of objectives and funds as well as the introduction of the principle of 
“monofunding”. As the principle of programming is concerned, the elimi-
nation of certain programming documents (e.g. programme complements), 
the streamlining of the implementation process as well as the introduction 
 
101 Commission (2002), p. 28.  
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of the “proportionality principle” are among the most important steps 
taken. 
Given the leading question of this paper, these changes might certainly be 
worth describing, but do not represent a major shift at the strategic level. 
However, there are two features which justify to speak of a new strategic 
approach by the Commission: 
1.  A strong link to the Lisbon Agenda 
2.  A shift of the Commission´s influence from the programming level 
to the strategic policy level 
(1) The strong link to the Lisbon Agenda is manifested in two different 
ways. First, there is a clear change at the linguistic level, most visible in the 
official documents of the Commission as described in chapter 5.4. While 
cohesion is still mentioned as a primary goal, all recent documents focus in 
the first place on notions like growth, competitiveness or innovation.  
Second, cohesion policy and Lisbon Agenda are connected at a procedural 
level including formal requirements that Member States have to fulfill. Un-
der the principle of concentration, these relate to the process of “earmark-
ing” which demands the old Member States (EU15) to spend a fixed share 
of the available funds to achieve goals mentioned in the Lisbon Agenda. 
Under the principle of programming, the link is most visible in the hierar-
chical structure of the new programming instruments where Community 
Strategic Guidelines define an indicative framework. This has to be re-
spected both on the national and regional level. In order to demonstrate 
compliance in this field, Member States have to report on a regular basis on 
the progress of their cohesion policy in meeting Community strategic goals.  
The reasons for introducing this clear link to the Lisbon Agenda can be di-
vided into two different categories: formal (practical) and informal (strate-
gic) reasons. The formal reasons given by the Commission were related to 
the weak performance of the European economy, which could only be en-
hanced through a strong focus on innovation, the knowledge society and 
investment in R&D etc. As European cohesion policy is considered to be 
most suitable to implement these policy goals, a connection between both 
“fields” seemed favourable. However, the Commission was guided also by Sonja Schröder 
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strategic reasons. Since there was a high pressure to cut back cohesion pol-
icy both in terms of money and content, a link to the Lisbon goals did not 
only legitimize the existence of European cohesion policy (beyond lagging 
regions), but also guaranteed the Commission to further exert its powers in 
the long-run.  
(2) The second major feature is a shift of the Commission´s influence from 
the programming level to the strategic policy level. This was most apparent 
not only in the introduction of Community Strategic Guidelines but also in 
the greater decentralisation of responsibilities and simplification of opera-
tional programmes. Allowing Member States more powers in the imple-
mentation and management of the funds has furthermore affected the 
principle of partnership. Since the Commission has less influence in this 
field, its direct cooperation with regional and local actors might be re-
stricted, too. 
Possible reasons for this second major feature can again be subdivided. Of-
ficially, the complex nature of the programming process was acknowledged 
as a severe obstacle. Therefore, decentralisation represented an appropriate 
means to enhance efficiency. However, a more interesting explanation can 
be found when taking into acccount the growing tensions between the 
Commission and the Member States in the run-up to the negotiations on a 
new cohesion framework. In return for decentralisation and a simplification 
of operational programmes as demanded by the Member States, the Com-
mission can now focus on strategic policy goals. Hereby the Commission 
ensures a coherent approach linked to the Lisbon Agenda, while making 
Member States more politically accountable for the implementation of the 
funds.  
Given the above analysis the main conclusion of this paper is that the 
Commission has adopted a new strategic approach in the framework pro-
gramme 2007-13. By partially linking allocation, programming and imple-
mentation of structural funds to the goals of the Lisbon Agenda, the 
Commission has altered long-term objectives of European cohesion policy. 
Whether this approach will promote economic growth and lead to greater 
cohesion across Europe, remains an interesting question for further re-
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